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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE INVISIBILITY OF AGENCY

From the earliest years of the “modern” mediation field, the principle
of party self-determination was seen and stated as the foundation of the
mediation process. 1 Indeed, this core principle of party self-determination was
seen as the distinguishing feature of mediation, by comparison to other thirdparty processes like arbitration or adjudication, in which a third party was the
authoritative decision maker. 2 Only in mediation could disputing parties have
the help of a third party who would help them make their own decisions, rather
than making decisions for them. Even in mediator ethical codes, the principle
of party self-determination was enshrined as a guiding principle from very
early on.3
Nevertheless, despite its supposedly central role, the value of selfdetermination has always faced competition from other values in the world of
mediation,4 and it has often fared badly in that competition. First, and most
obvious, the pressure to achieve settlements—especially when mediation was
linked to the courts—has often diluted the commitment to the principle of self1

See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 15–21 (2001); Anne Milne & Jay Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce
Mediation: An Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Jay Folberg &
Anne Milne eds., 1998).
2
See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection or Empowerment and
Recognition: The Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA L. REV.
253, 262–63, 270–73 (1989); Welsh, supra note 1, at 15–18.
3
See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY
DISPUTES, STANDARD I.C., III.C. (1984), 18 FAM. L. Q. 363, 363–65 (1984). See also
Welsh, supra note 1, at 34–52 (analyzing the principle of self-determination in the
mediator ethics rules of the Florida state mediation system, adopted in 1992).
4
Besides the value of reconciliation mentioned in the text, perhaps the most persistent
competitor has been the value of justice, or protection of vulnerable parties. One classic
example is the “debate” in 1981 between Joseph Stulberg, a leading mediator and trainer,
and Lawrence Susskind, a prominent environmental and public policy mediator, about the
mediator’s “accountability” for the fairness of settlements. In effect, the tension was
between the value of self-determination and the value of justice or protection, and there
was substantial disagreement about which value was superior. Susskind argued that in
mediating cases involving interests of parties not at the table—like many environmental
conflicts—mediators had an obligation to ensure fairness to unrepresented interests, and
that they should block resolutions that lacked such fairness, even if that would attenuate
self-determination for the parties at the table. Stulberg argued that mediators could not do
so, because of their need for neutrality—and should not do so, because of the value of party
self-determination. See Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply
to Professor Susskind, 6 VERMONT L. REV. 85 (1981); Lawrence Susskind, Environmental
Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VERMONT L. REV. 1 (1981).
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determination. Many research studies have documented the way in which
mediators exert pressure on parties—sometimes coming close to coercion—to
settle their case, and few argue that this is rare or even uncommon.5
But beyond the goal of settlement, other values have also led
mediation, and mediators, away from the supposedly foundational
commitment to party self-determination. Another example is found in the
areas of practice in which fostering inter-party understanding, and even
reconciliation, is seen as a major goal. Once such arena is in restorative justice
and victim-offender mediation, where a primary goal of the process is to
promote understanding and empathy between the parties, and thereby heal or
restore the relationship or community that was damaged by the original
offense.6 There is ample evidence that practitioners in these areas use directive
practices with the aim of promoting understanding and empathy, and evoking
forgiveness and reconciliation. The same is true of both practice and theory in
the area of divorce and family mediation, where mediators seek mutual
understanding between the parties, if not reconciliation. 7 In all these areas,
5

See Welsh, supra note 1; Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, Conclusion: The
Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 459,
468–70 (1994). See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: The
“Problem” in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 863, 870–71 &
nn.38–40 (2008); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on
Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEVADA
L. REV. 399, 405–08 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation
in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RES. 117 (2004); JONATHAN G.
SHAILOR, EMPOWERMENT IN DISPUTE MEDIATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
COMMUNICATION 48 (1994) (reporting based on findings of detailed case studies of three
mediations that, for two out of the three mediators studied, “everything the mediators do
is geared toward … the procurement of mediation’s product—an agreement,” and noting
that mediators created their own meaning of a “good agreement.”); Stacy Burns, The Name
of the Game is Movement: Concession Seeking in Judicial Mediation of Large Money
Damages Cases, 15 MEDIATION Q. 359, 360–63 (1998) (describing various strategies that
mediators use to pressure for settlements).
6
See John Paul Lederach & Ron Kraybill, The Paradox of Popular Justice: A
Practitioner’s View, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF
COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 357, 358–63, 369–70 (Sally Engle Merry
& Neal Milner eds., 1993); MARK S. UMBREIT, MEDIATING INTERPERSONAL CONFLICTS: A
PATHWAY TO PEACE 137 (1995); Jennifer Michelle Cunha, Comment, Family Group
Conferences: Healing the Wounds of Juvenile Property Crime in New Zealand and the
United States, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 283, 292–93 (1999).
7
See, e.g., Milne & Folberg, supra note 1, at 7–9 (Jay Folberg & Anne Milne eds.,
1988); Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y
7, 20–25 (1986). And this value plays a prominent role in several emerging new theories
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many theorists and practitioners consider it appropriate to engage in practices
that may limit party self-determination, in order to promote greater
understanding, empathy, and improved relationships. In sum, from the early
days of the mediation field, other values have worked to “lure” mediators away
from their ostensible prior commitment to party self-determination.
The introduction in 1994 of a new “model” of practice called
“transformative mediation” was in part a response to this trend in the field to
subordinate the originally supreme value of party self-determination to other
goals like those just described. Indeed, the book that introduced the model,
The Promise of Mediation,8 was read by many—and fairly so—as a critique
of the common practices used by mediators at that time, arguing that those
directive practices were inconsistent and even contradictory to the unique
values that had been espoused for mediation.9 Promise went on to call for a
return to the primacy of party self-determination, and suggested an approach
to practice that would embody that value.
However, it could be argued—and was, by some—that the model
sketched out in the book was just as directive, in its way, as the practices it
criticized.10 The first part of this article examines why that happened, and why
it took many years to correct and to identify practices that genuinely further
party self-determination. Tracing that history is the best foundation for
understanding why party self-determination—party agency—is the real heart
of the transformative mediation model, and why those who follow the model
are committed to it. Practiced properly, transformative mediation can be a
powerful vehicle for supporting party agency; and as discussed in the second
Part of this Article, one fundamental justification for transformative mediation
is the profound importance of human agency.
The immediate impetus for writing this Article is that, even today,
talented students and practitioners of transformative mediation still
underemphasize the importance of client “empowerment”—the opportunity

of mediation, including “insight mediation” and “understanding-based mediation.” See
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit or Breaking Free: The Relationship of Mediation
to the Courts over Four Decades, 84 N. D. L. REV. 705, at nn. 115–119 (2008) (describing
the key elements of these and other new models of mediation).
8
ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994)
[hereinafter, PROMISE].
9
See, e.g., James B. Boskey, Book Review: The Promise of Mediation, The Alternative
Newsletter, Mar. 1995.
10
One observed, “Bush has long been uncomfortable with mediators who take a
directive stance in the mediation process, but by focusing on transformation he proposes
an approach that is at least equally controlling.” Id.
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for clients to recapture the sense of agency that conflict has compromised.11
That is, those learning and using the skills of a client-centered process like
transformative mediation tend to overlook and ignore the achievement of
client empowerment, compared to other goals, whether involving outcome or
process. Why does the achievement of client empowerment go unseen in this
way, even when its value has been explained and emphasized in readings,
written work, training, and otherwise? Addressing this “invisibility” of client
empowerment is a major challenge for those who ascribe importance to the
impact mediation can have on restoring clients’ sense of agency in the wake
of conflict. That is one purpose of this Article
However, the effort to meet that challenge makes sense only if one
accepts the premise that client agency—and human agency in general—is a
core value whose preservation and furtherance should stand at the center of
any client assistance process. That premise lies at the heart of transformative
mediation theory and practice, and other related processes. 12 What justifies
that premise? What is it that explains the value placed by transformative
mediation adherents (and others) on this phenomenon of human agency per
se? Answering that question, primarily but not only in the context of
mediators’ work, is a second major aim of this Article.
To achieve these aims, this Article will begin, in Part One, by retracing
the path that originally brought the authors and many others to study and
practice mediation, and how that path changed its course several times over
the past thirty years, in conjunction with changed perceptions of the
importance of client agency. Part One will show first that the practice of
mediation, even by those theoretically committed to the principle of selfdetermination, diluted that principle by placing less importance on client
agency than on other values, especially the value of empathy and relationship.
Second, it will show how practitioners of transformative mediation, through a
process of reflection and self-critique, recognized their departure from the

11

ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 60–61 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter PROMISE 2].
12
Regarding transformative mediation, see BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 11, at 59–62,
250–56; Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation Skills and Client-Centered Lawyering: A New
View of the Partnership, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 429, 450–51 (2013). Regarding other
processes, see, e.g., Robert. D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 512–17 (1990) (discussing lawyering); Spencer Rand,
Teaching Law Students to Practice Social Justice: An Interdisciplinary Search for Help
Through Social Work's Empowerment Approach, 13 CLINICAL. L. REV. 459, 485 (2006)
(discussing social work); CARL R. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT
PRACTICE, IMPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1951) (discussing psychology); Dinerstein, supra,
at 517–34, 538–44, 548–551 (discussing several other fields).
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principle of self-determination and took steps to correct their actual practices
in ways that did place primary value on client agency.
Part Two of the Article will explain the meaning of agency, as a basis
for mediation and other social processes, as the self-aware and reflective
assertion by an individual of the intentional choice to make decisions affecting
their life circumstances. So agency and self-determination are related if not
identical. It will be argued that the phenomenon of agency is at the core of
human identity and consciousness; that is, the assertion of agency is an
essential and existential meaning of being human, regardless of whether it
achieves some other specific impact in the external world. Part Three of the
Article will show that, although the value of client agency and client-centered
practice is largely disfavored in the dominant practices of mediation and other
“helping” professions,13 that value does find strong recognition among many
in the society, as reflected in popular culture, and as voiced by the clients of
transformative mediators.
The Article concludes that the stakes of raising awareness of the
importance of agency, in mediation and other social processes, are very
great—implicating the character of our civic culture and the viability of our
democratic society; therefore, it is important that, in any process such as
mediation where a client-centered approach is possible, that approach should
be favored and promoted—since it will recognize and enact the central value
of human agency.

PART ONE: SELF DETERMINATION –THE JOURNEY AWAY AND
BACK

II.

A. The Promise of Mediation: Moving from Agency to
Empathy
The authors of this article met roughly three decades ago at one of the
many “community mediation centers” that serve parties in conflict in the New
York area. One of them was presenting a training program at that center, and
the other was a coach in that program. In one of the simulated cases used to
demonstrate the mediator’s methods, a slow-witted worker had been attacked
and humiliated as a “bozo” by his impatient boss. The mediator, in a private
“caucus”, pressed the boss to consider how hard the worker was trying to do
13

See, e.g., Bush, supra note 7, at 739–42 (2008) (discussing and citing research on
the prevalence of directive practice in mediation); Dinerstein, supra note 12, passim
(discussing directive practice in lawyering and other professions). See also supra text
accompanying note 5.
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his job, despite his limited capability, and to imagine the harsh effect the namecalling had on the worker’s self-respect. The method was explained as a way
of evoking understanding or empathy from the employer, which could
obviously help promote a settlement of the case. But the response to this
demonstration, from both the coach and the trainees, was that this practice of
offering a sympathetic explanation of one party to the other had value
independent of the effect on settlement. That was the value of the experience
of empathy per se, as an expression of human connection despite the presence
of great differences.14 For almost everyone present, realizing the power of
mediation to evoke this kind of human connection explained why they were
attracted to learn and practice this process—their desire to be the instruments
of increasing understanding and empathy in situations where enmity was the
starting point.
For the authors of this Article, this impulse to help parties move from
enmity to empathy was a core motivation for their becoming mediators—and
for adopting what came to be called the transformative model of practice,
where the goal was not only settlement but also a “transformation” of the
parties’ attitudes toward each other.15 That model of practice was introduced
to the field in a book that influenced many mediators who resonated with this
view of the goal and value of mediation—The Promise of Mediation.16 That
book named two goals as central to the mediation process, both of which went
beyond the goal of settlement per se—empowerment and recognition. The first
focused on how the process could help clients reassert their sense of agency,
the second on how they could activate their sense of empathy, both of which
are often damaged by the experience of negative conflict. 17 And while both
14

See Dorothy J. Della Noce, Seeing Theory in Practice: An Analysis of Empathy in
Mediation, 15 NEG. J. 271 (1999) (explaining the relation of empathy to mediation
practice).
15
See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 51–62; Bush, supra note 2, at 266–73.
16
PROMISE supra note 8.
17
See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 54–62. In transformative theory, the terms
“empowerment” and “recognition” are shorthand for the shifts or movements parties make
in mediation, as they regain their capacities for agency and empathy, both of which are
inherent in human beings but likely to be compromised by negative conflict interaction.
Supporting these shifts is the mediator’s goal in the process. Underlying this goal, in the
“relational” theory that informs transformative mediation, is the value placed on party
agency or self-determination and on interparty empathy or understanding. Where the terms
“empowerment” and “recognition” are used in this Article, they are meant to refer to the
dynamic shifts parties make that increase agency or empathy, even where the word “shifts”
is not used. Increased agency or empathy are the valued effects of these shifts. In relational
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were presented as core goals of this approach to mediation, in both the book
itself and the training and practice that grew out of the book, the recognition
goal soon emerged in practice as the driving value behind the kinds of
practices suggested for “transformative mediators”. How that happened can be
illustrated by reference to the book itself, and developments following its
publication.
In the first published work on transformative mediation, there were
inherent contradictions in the treatment of empowerment and recognition.
Thus, in the article that first articulated the empowerment concept in 1989, it
stated that the “empowerment-and-recognition” conception of the mediator’s
role requires a “pushy mediator,” who will not be passive but will push the
parties to make informed and deliberate decisions and to reexamine negative
views of each other.18 Looking back, this obviously involves a contradiction.
The kind of pushiness being called for would in itself undermine party selfdetermination in many cases—by insisting that “the parties consider and
understand fully the consequences of either outcome, before they decide for
or against agreement,” and by pushing “for each party to hear and understand
the other’s position … [and] express a measure of recognition of the other
party’s situation.”19
When Promise was published five years later, it clarified that a
“successful mediation,” is one in which, “the parties have been helped to make

theory as presented in Promise 2, agency and empathy are seen as co-equal and
interdependent elements inherent in human nature, and this Article does not intend any
departure from that premise. However, because of the tendency of even transformative
mediators to undervalue party agency, the focus of this Article is on the empowerment shift
and agency, and the negative impact of this undervaluation. (A parallel approach is taken
by Della Noce, who focuses exclusively on the empathy element in the relational theory,
while noting that agency is a co-equal element in that theory and in transformative
mediation. See Della Noce, supra note 14, at note 8. Her focus on empathy is explained by
her view that the meaning and importance of this element is given inadequate attention in
mediation literature. See id. at 279–82. The focus of this Article on the agency element is
based on a similar assessment regarding inadequate attention to the agency element). Other
points made in this Article are also rooted in relational theory, such as the idea that the
agentic self is not static but is actually constructed through interaction with the outside
world, and especially with other selves in human interaction. See infra text accompanying
notes 70–71. In short, nothing in this Article should be read as departing from or
contradicting the theory of transformative mediation as articulated in Promise 2.
18
See Bush, supra note 2, at 277–83.
19
Id. at 279–81. Still, such inconsistency might be expected at such an early stage in
the emergence of a new conception. The account given here of the history of the
transformative model draws in part from Robert A Baruch Bush, Taking SelfDetermination Seriously, in J.P. Folger et al. eds., TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION:
A SOURCEBOOK 51 (Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation, 2010).
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informed, deliberate and free choices about how to proceed at every decision
point” and “helped to give recognition whenever it was their decision to do
so.”20 This emphasis on “helping” rather than “pushing” the parties to make
informed choices and to extend (or refuse) recognition is much more
consistent with the primary value of party self-determination that underlies the
transformative model.21So is the clear statement that “the definition of
empowerment per se reminds the mediator that even a ‘poor outcome’
produced by the party’s own process of reflection and choice strengthens the
self more than a ‘good outcome’ induced by the mediator’s directiveness or
imposition.”22 It appeared that the initial contradiction between “pushiness”
and empowerment was resolved in favor of empowerment.
However, Promise also describes the patterns of transformative
mediation practice as “encouraging deliberation and choice making” and
“encouraging perspective taking.”23 These two patterns could, depending on
how they are carried out, involve the kind of “pushiness” that was advocated
five years earlier. In fact, in the case study used in Promise to illustrate
transformative practice, the mediator’s practices did just that. In the LandlordTenant case of Promise, the session began with a fairly standard “opening
statement” in which the mediator set ground rules, which he later enforced.
Later in the session, the mediator “stepped in and said that, if neither party
objected, he wanted to speak to each privately.”24 In these instances and many
others in the session, the mediator’s interventions preempted party choices. Of
course, the choices preempted were choices about process, not outcome. But
the practices of the mediator in the case study could certainly be called
“pushy” rather than supportive of empowerment and party self-determination.
Beyond these process issues, the directiveness of the mediator was
evident in his effort to “support” inter-party recognition shifts. The
transformative mediator in Promise focused on interventions in which he
would “reinterpret, translate, and reframe parties’ statements” and “ask parties
to consider the significance of such reformulations.”25 For example, in caucus
with the tenant, the mediator asked how her once-friendly relationship with
the landlord had soured, and she answered that the landlord had pressed her
hard for the rent even though she had obviously been in the midst of some
personal problems. After sympathizing, the mediator asked her:

20

PROMISE, supra note 8, at 95.
See Bush, supra note 2, at 270–73.
22
PROMISE, supra note 8, at 88.
23
Id. at 100–01.
24
Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
25
Id. at 101.
21
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[W]hether she thought it was possible that the
reason [the landlord pressed by] continuing
to call her was not that he didn’t trust her but
that since it was wintertime, [the landlord]
felt pressed himself to find out about the rent,
because his bills were higher, so he couldn’t
be as flexible as he might have wanted to
be.26
In short, for the sake of trying to evoke recognition, this mediator was
“pushing” the tenant quite a bit to consider things that she hadn’t thought of—
and probably wouldn’t have—without the mediator’s suggestions. He was in
effect telling her that she should entertain reconsiderations like these. He was
employing a measure of directiveness for the sake of producing a recognition
shift. In Promise, this is offered as a good example of how transformative
practice tries to support recognition shifts. The same kind of intervention is
repeated several times with each party.27
Thus, despite a clear theoretical commitment to the value of party selfdetermination and empowerment (client agency), the examples offered in
Promise as transformative interventions actually involved a significant degree
of mediator directiveness. And the strongest motive for this directiveness
seems to have been the goal of “evoking recognition.”28 To put it differently,
as between empowerment and recognition shifts, the recognition shift
emerged as the higher goal in actual practice, so that evoking recognition
would justify directive interventions, even though they may have diluted party
self-determination. Thus, while the stated theory claimed that empowerment
had to be the foundation for recognition, the practices used by mediators trying
to follow this “new model”—including the authors of this Article—displayed
a willingness to move away from empowerment in order to evoke
recognition.29 The clear question is: Why did the goal of recognition/empathy
26

Id.
Id. at 163–78.
28
Id. at 160.
29
None of this escaped early critics of transformative mediation, whose criticisms
seen in retrospect may be fairer than they seemed at the time. One observed, “Bush has
long been uncomfortable with mediators who take a directive stance in the mediation
process, but by focusing on transformation he proposes an approach that is at least equally
controlling.” Boskey, supra note 9. This critic may have rightly sensed that it was the
recognition value that was operating in Promise as the heart of transformation, and as thus
justifying directive interventions. If this kind of critique arose from a serious reading of
27
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seemingly displace the goal of empowerment/agency, in the practice of
transformative mediation as originally enacted—especially since the theory
behind that practice put these goals in precisely the opposite order?

B. Placing the Emphasis on Recognition
Answering this question involves looking at the larger context of the
mediation field and its history prior to the advent of transformative mediation,
as briefly described in the Introduction above. As noted there, despite its
supposedly central role, the value of self-determination has always faced
competition from other values in the world of mediation.30 Also discussed
above, one particular value that has long competed with self-determination for
the minds and hearts of mediators, and worked to “lure” them away from their
ostensible prior commitment to party self-determination, is the value of
relationship or reconciliation.
This context helps to answer the question posed above: Why did early
enactments of transformative practice display a directiveness that is
inconsistent with party empowerment? The answer is that the lure of other
values was difficult to identify and resist, even as transformative practice was
being articulated on different grounds. In particular, for early transformative
mediators the alluring competitor was the value of promoting understanding,
empathy or relationship—in the terms of transformative theory, achieving
inter-party recognition shifts. And the lure of this value worked to overpower
the supposedly more basic value of empowerment. As described earlier, the
mediator in the Landlord-Tenant case employed directive practices and did so
out of a concern for promoting recognition,31 and so did many others who
followed his example.
Indeed, for many mediators the great “successes” were the cases
where the parties came to a new understanding of each other. 32 Promoting
the illustrative interventions just described, it can be understood as a justified challenge to
an inconsistency between the “rhetoric and reality,” theory and practice, of transformative
mediation as presented in Promise.
30
See supra text accompanying notes 4–7.
31
See supra text accompanying notes 23–28.
32
Indeed, when training was first offered in transformative mediation, the first
exercise was usually one called “success stories,” in which the participants – usually
experienced mediators trained in other methods – were asked to reflect on their past cases,
identify for themselves their real “successes,” and then say what aspect of the case made
it such a “success” in their eyes. The most frequent answer, expressed in various ways, was
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understanding, empathy and connection between people separated by
conflict—what could be more significant? It is thus understandable that
transformative mediation practitioners, including the model’s originators,
were initially drawn into focusing on recognition and giving less attention to
empowerment, despite the fact that this contradicted the basic theory itself.
And as the transformative model grew in popularity, a major reason for this
growth was that people were very interested in the recognition shift. The
appeal of the transformative model was the possibility that, through using it,
parties’ attitudes towards each other would change for the better. Mediation
would “get” parties to change the way they saw each other, so their
relationships and lives would improve—in families, in communities, in the
workplace.33 It seems that it was natural for both the suppliers and the
consumers of transformative mediation to implicitly take the view that the
recognition shift was the main point, precisely because the empathy value is
so alluring. So, if recognition tended to displace empowerment in the hierarchy
of transformative practice, one reason was the great allure of the recognition
shift. Another reason was the unobtrusiveness of the empowerment shift itself.

C. Failing to Notice Empowerment
Even the best transformative mediation students, when explaining
why using their transformative skills has value, often refer to recognition
rather than empowerment. For example, in a recent course, one simulated
mediation in the course involved a Muslim worker and a white supervisor, and
in the mediation the worker became very clear that the supervisor had no
interest in understanding her isolation in the workplace because of her religion.
The student’s self-assessment of the case was that the mediation was
unsuccessful because “it failed to achieve increased understanding between
the parties.” Another case involved two neighbors, a mother with young noisy
the moment in these cases where “the light went on” for the parties and they “saw each
other differently.” See, e.g., Paul Charbonneau, How Practical is Theory? in DESIGNING
MEDIATION: APPROACHES TO TRAINING AND PRACTICE WITHIN A TRANSFORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK 37, 46–47 (Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush eds., 2001) [hereafter,
DESIGNING MEDIATION]. This exercise was very useful to draw mediators’ attention to the
value they themselves saw in such “recognition,” and to then interest them into the study
of how to practice mediation in ways that pursue this goal rather than the goal of agreement.
33
This was part of what interested corporate agencies like the United States Postal
Service in using transformative mediation for workplace conflict. See Cynthia J.
Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture: Lessons Learned from Swimming Upstream,
18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 375, 378 (2001) (“I knew almost any type of mediation
could result in settlements, but the Postal Service wanted more...I needed more than
‘deals.’ I was looking for improved relationships.”).
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children and a veteran counseling ex-convicts in his apartment. The student’s
reflection afterwards was that, although the mother became very clear that the
veteran’s counseling sessions were a threat to her family, the mediation did
not succeed because she “failed to change her perspective” about those
sessions. In these and other examples, students assessed their own work as
unsuccessful because one or both parties did not make “recognition shifts”—
even though one or both gained clarity and confidence about their situation
and position. Essentially, although the mediations often showed empowerment
shifts and increased party agency, they were seen as lacking because the
parties did not make recognition shifts. Whereas, in cases where parties did
become more understanding of each other during the session, the students saw
these as successful mediations—but without mentioning that the parties also
became clearer, more confident, and stronger in the mediation. In short,
recognition shifts got the students’ attention, while empowerment got little or
none, even though it was just as significant in the mediations. In effect,
empowerment shifts simply went unnoticed.
So, it is not just that empowerment got overshadowed by recognition;
it was simply overlooked in itself. One reason for this is that empowerment
shifts go unnoticed because they are harder to identify. This point can be
explained by reference to the discourse studies concept of conversational
“markers.”34 Markers are forms of expression, verbal or nonverbal, that signify
a development in conversation that is considered important for some reason.
As used here, “markers” are expressions in conflict conversation that are signs
of a party shift from weakness to strength, or from alienation to connection.35
Though conflict conversation usually contains both kinds of expressions, the
markers of empowerment shifts are typically less obvious than those of
recognition shifts. Apologies, statements of changed perspective, even
changes in tone of voice and manner of address, are all markers of recognition
shifts. These markers are all quite noticeable in a mediated conversation—not
only because of the high value placed on recognition, but also because
expressions of recognition usually involve a sharp contrast with the tone and
substance of the conversation preceding them. Moreover, these expressions
are themselves, most often, noticeably positive. It is not just that the negative
of hostility or suspicion is lessened; rather, the positive of acceptance or

34

See Dorothy J. Della Noce, Ideologically Based Patterns in the Discourse of
Mediators: A Comparison of Problem Solving and Transformative Practice, Ann Arbor,
Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services, 2002 (unpublished) (on file with author).
35
See, e.g., Janet K. Moen et al., Identifying Opportunities for Empowerment and
Recognition, in DESIGNING MEDIATION, supra note 32, at 112; PROMISE 2, supra note 11,
at 167–69, 180–84.
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understanding appears quite visibly. So, these markers stand out, attract our
attention, and seem central to mediation “successes.”
The markers of empowerment shifts, by contrast, tend to be less
dramatic. When a party’s statements become less confused and rambling,
more focused and articulate, this often comes as a relief to a mediator or
observer. But it does not necessarily stand out as a dramatic change—although
it is a marker of an empowerment shift. Similarly, when a party’s expressions
become less hesitant and more confident, or less agitated and more measured,
such changes are markers of empowerment shifts. But these also may attract
less attention, both because they are often quite subtle and also because they
are noticed as the absence or removal of a negative—less confusion, less
agitation, less hesitancy—rather than the occurrence of a positive. The positive
appearance of clarity, calm and confidence may simply be subsumed in the
dissipation of the negative; and when this happens, the marker of an
empowerment shift is missed. These reasons help explain why empowerment
shifts and party agency, despite their foundational importance in
transformative theory, tended to be overlooked and underemphasized in
transformative practice.
In our most recent mediation class, the students’ difficulty in seeing
empowerment shifts motivated us to offer them a “typology” of such
transitions. Thus, we labelled different types of empowerment shifts and asked
the students to identify points in their mediations where one or both parties:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

stood up for him/herself (advocacy)
acknowledged his/her own problem (awareness)
used an argument to persuade the other party (persuasiveness)
realized his/her responsibility for the conflict (responsibility)
became very clear about the problem/situation (clarity)
suggested a solution/course of action (problem-solving)
demanded self-protective measures (self-protection)
used eloquent or powerful language (self-expression)
engaged in “thinking it through” (deliberation)
came to a strong decision (decision-making)

This typology definitely helped the students to notice the parties’
empowerment shifts, but the need for such a typology is further evidence that
these shifts are not easy to notice by comparison to the recognition shifts that
students saw so readily.
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D. Moving Back to Empowerment: Re-focusing the Model on
Party Agency
As described above, despite a strong theoretical commitment to party
self-determination, the early practitioners of the model—including this
Article’s authors—often focused more on recognition shifts as the primary
goal, and tended to employ directive interventions in order to achieve that goal.
The path to transformative practice led away from a focus of client
empowerment and agency. However, a new period soon began in the
development of transformative mediation practice, with the work of talented
mediators who undertook to put their practice more in keeping with the theory
articulated in Promise, especially as to client agency and empowerment.
Prominent among these was Sally Pope, an experienced family and
commercial mediator. After reading Promise of Mediation, Pope resonated
with the transformative model and began to experiment with using it. In that
process, she began to question many of the practices she’d learned earlier in
her career and to look for different practices more consistent with the
transformative model.36 What she found were practices that went away from
being directive and beyond the focus on recognition and empathy—instead
moving toward a stronger focus on party agency. As close colleagues of Pope,
the authors of this Article were impressed and influenced by her move toward
greater client agency.
Pope’s earliest moves in this direction involved the opening of her
mediation sessions, which she had always conducted using a standard opening
statement describing the process, setting ground rules, establishing
confidentiality, informing parties about caucusing, and so on. Gradually, she
realized that every one of these elements in her opening was “supplanting”
party decision-making, so she began to “throw open” the opening—inviting
the parties into an “opening conversation” in which they themselves decided
about ground rules, confidentiality, goals and reasons for using mediation.37
Pope had started her mediation career practicing the conventional, “facilitative”
approach to the process. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations,
Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).
According to one authoritative view of the facilitative model, the mediator in that model
acts as facilitator or manager of the parties’ negotiation or problem-solving process. She/he
establishes ground rules, facilitates information exchange, defines issues and structures an
agenda, and tries to generate movement toward agreement by various means – such as
encouraging parties to focus on interests rather than positions, emphasizing areas of
agreement, discouraging discussions of past incidents and limiting expressions of intense
negative emotions.
37
See Sally Ganong Pope, Inviting Fortuitous Events in Mediation: The Role of
Empowerment and Recognition, 13 MEDIATION Q. 287 (1996).
36
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For Pope and others, this “rethinking” of how to begin a session was the
beginning of an ongoing exploration of the concrete meaning of
transformative practice.38 Most significant for this chapter, much of this
exploration focused directly on practices that supported party empowerment
shifts and increased party agency. This new generation of work began to
realign the development of transformative practice with the premise of the
model that empowerment shifts, and party agency, were primary and
foundational in transformative mediation.39
Pope was also involved in a major initiative to train mediators in the
transformative model, one part of which involved producing a video to
demonstrate transformative practices in a simulated workplace conflict. 40 The
authors of this Article partnered with Pope in the making of this video. By the
time the video was made, Pope and others had developed considerable
expertise using transformative interventions, and the practices shown on the
video clearly demonstrated what it meant for a mediator to take seriously the
principle of supporting and not supplanting party decision-making, and thus
supporting increased party agency. The video was used for training beginning
in 1998, and the impact on audiences was electric. They saw for the first time
a set of practices that consistently supported party choices and agency at every
decision point in a mediation session, and they saw how the impact of those
practices was to facilitate empowerment shifts for both parties to the
mediation. For some the picture was inspiring, and for some it was shocking;
but for all the training participants, the centrality of empowerment and client
agency in transformative mediation was made very clear.
This picture of “second generation” practice was crystallized and
disseminated still further when two new publications emerged. The first was
another video, The Purple House Mediation, featuring one of the authors of
this Article as the mediator of an interracial housing conflict, and presenting
another concrete picture of practice in which empowerment shifts are clearly
seen as the foundation for conflict transformation. 41 The second publication
was a completely revised edition of Promise of Mediation (Promise 2), which
clarified the relative place of empowerment and recognition shifts in conflict
38
See, e.g., James A. Antes et al., Is a Stage Model of Mediation Necessary, 16
MEDIATION Q. 287 (1999); Susan Beale & Judith A. Saul, Examining Assumptions:
Training Mediators for Transformative Practice, in DESIGNING MEDIATION, supra note 32,
at 1, 12–15. Erling O. Jorgensen et al., Microfocus in Mediation: The What and How of
Transformative Opportunities, in DESIGNING MEDIATION, supra note 32, at 133.
39
See supra text accompanying notes 20–22.
40
DVD: SARAH AND BERNARD, R.A. Bush & S.G. Pope eds. (U.S. Postal Service
1997).
41
THE “PURPLE” HOUSE CONVERSATIONS, (Institute for the Study of Conflict
Transformation 2001).
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transformation and included the Purple House Mediation in transcript form as
a case study.42 Like the response to Pope’s original video, the response to the
Purple House video was powerful and diverse. Some could not understand
why the mediator in the case does not do more to bridge the misunderstanding
between the parties and promote recognition.43 Others understood that the
reason for this is that the mediator works first and foremost to consistently
promote party empowerment shifts and agency, and that it is on the foundation
of these primary shifts that recognition shifts can—and do, in Purple House—
subsequently take place. In the words of Promise 2:
The mediator’s primary goals are (1) to
support
empowerment
shifts,
by
supporting—but never supplanting—each
party’s deliberation and decision making, at
every point in the session where choices arise
(regarding either process or outcome) and
(2) to support recognition shifts, by
encouraging and supporting—but never
forcing—each party’s freely chosen efforts to
achieve new understandings of the other’s
perspective.44

42

PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 131–214.
See, e.g., Ran Kuttner, Striving to Fulfill the Promise: The Purple House
Conversations and the Practice of Transformative Mediation, 22 NEGOT. J. 331, 340–45
(2006).
44
PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 66 (emphasis added). Our aim in this Article is not to
summarize the whole of transformative mediation theory, but it is important to note here
one central point about the meaning of “recognition”, “empathy” and “understanding” in
this theory. These terms do not mean only major and positive shifts in a party’s view of the
other. Even slight positive changes in perceptions of the other party can qualify as
recognition shifts. And even becoming clearer about a negative perception of the other can
qualify – as when a party comes to realize in mediation that their relationship with the other
party is not viable because of a negative in that party that is unlikely to change. In fact, this
kind of realization represents both an empowerment and a recognition shift and is not
uncommon in mediations. See infra note 90, for an extended discussion of such a case.
43

608

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

The explanation made it clear that the empowerment shift, the exercise of party
agency, is the condition on which all else in conflict transformation, including
the recognition shift, depends.45
Thus, the picture of transformative practice became clearer over the
years—and more consistent with its underlying theory. And the early missteps,
whether due to the allure of the recognition goal (increasing empathy) or the
unobtrusiveness of the empowerment goal (increasing agency), were slowly
corrected in training and in practice—including for the authors of this Article.
The result is not only a theory, but a form of practice, in which empowerment
comes first, in terms of its conceptual value and its practical importance. The
picture of transformative mediation today is a picture that acknowledges and
maintains the centrality of party self-determination and agency, not only in
theory but in mediation practice.
And yet this raises the question stated at the outset, which has
increasingly troubled the authors of this Article: Why do students and
practitioners of this model, even now, assess success and failure based
primarily on whether the parties showed empathy and made recognition shifts,
rather than whether the parties acted with increased agency and gained clarity
and strength in the process? That is the focus of the remainder of this Article.

III.

PART TWO: MEDIATION AND HUMAN AGENCY
A. The Problem: The Invisibility of Agency

As noted earlier, even the most talented students and mediators
regularly assess their mediations as successful or not based on whether the
parties made “recognition shifts”— that is, whether they expressed greater
understanding and empathy for each other. Where those kinds of shifts occur,
transformative mediators feel gratified. Where they do not, the mediators often
45

Comparison to the Landlord-Tenant case of Promise is instructive. There are
certainly places in Purple House where the mediator could “suggest reinterpretations” to
each party of the other’s current statements or past conduct, asking them to imagine more
favorable motives for each other’s behavior. This was the key example given earlier to
illustrate how the Landlord-Tenant mediator, to use the language of Promise, tries to
“evoke recognition.” By contrast, there were no interventions of this kind by the mediator
in Purple House – precisely because, to use the language of this newer picture, such
suggested reinterpretations would risk both “supplanting party deliberation” and “forcing
recognition.” That is, mediator reinterpretations would undermine rather than support
empowerment shifts, as well as the genuine recognition shifts that might be built on them.
Instead, the mediator was careful to “reflect” and “amplify” the conversation in ways that
always supported the parties’ agency in making their own choices – including the choice
of whether, when and how to extend recognition to each other.
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see the session as frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful. 46 This identification
of success with the achievement of increased inter-party understanding misses
the importance of client “empowerment”—the extent to which clients and
parties are offered, and then take, the opportunity the process affords to
recapture the sense of agency and self-determination that conflict has
compromised.
Understanding
this
“invisibility”
of
client
agency/empowerment, and addressing it, is a major challenge to those who
ascribe importance to the positive effect mediation can have on restoring
clients’ full sense of agency in the wake of conflict. This challenge has led the
authors to realize their own deep commitment to the value of human agency.
They have also realized that they cannot explain their commitment to the core
principle of party self-determination in mediation without delving into and
explaining their own larger commitment to the value of human agency.
Reflecting on the source of this commitment, the authors confronted
each other with a question: If mediators “get” the practices of transformative
mediation and perform them with real skill, why does it matter to us whether
they recognize that what they are doing is increasing party agency, and that
this is its real value? Searching for an answer led both of us to realize that our
own real interest goes beyond the subject of mediation per se. What makes
mediation important as a social process is that it is, or can be, a very good
vehicle for increasing human agency. In other words, human agency is the
truly important subject, and mediation puts a spotlight on that subject. Our real
interest, and our real sense of what’s important to notice and support, is the
value of agency itself.

B. Defining and Understanding Human Agency
In a course or training on transformative mediation, it is barely
possible to mention, much less to explore deeply, the phenomenon of human
agency and its enormous value, to individuals and to society as a whole. Yet,
without understanding this value, advocating for transformative mediation—
or any party-centered practice— will likely not succeed in changing the
character of the field. This connection between transformative mediation and
larger societal structures and processes was noted in the Foreword to Promise
of Mediation twenty-five years ago.47 Since then, most of the effort has been
on explaining the process itself and teaching its specific client-centered

46
47
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practices.48 But those practices will continue to gain only limited traction
unless the case is made for their larger societal impacts. This may explain why,
in many professions, client-centered practice is a minority approach, while
expert-driven modes of practice dominate.49 Client-centered practices are
undervalued because the gains in human agency that they foster are
undervalued, in comparison to other goals. Therefore, at this juncture, what is
needed is to focus directly on the larger societal implications of client-centered
practices, which relate to the place our society affords or denies, and the value
it ascribes or denies, to the phenomenon of human agency. That is the aim of
this part of the Article, although some examples will be drawn later from the
realm of transformative mediation.50
Human agency is a concept that has been the focus of much study and
discussion in multiple fields, including philosophy, psychology, sociology and
others.51 In those fields, the concept has been defined and explained in multiple
ways, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine or even summarize
that multidisciplinary discussion. Instead, for purposes of this Article, a
working definition of agency will be posited, drawn from sources in the fields
mentioned above, as follows: Agency is the self-aware and reflective assertion
by an individual of the intentional choice to make decisions affecting their life
circumstances. In this sense, agency and the concept of self-determination are
related if not identical. Also, in this definition, agency is not absolute; that is,
individuals’ agency is usually limited by their environment and surrounding
social structures.52 Nevertheless, they can still exercise a measure of agency
within those limits.
Working with this definition, the premise of this Article, supported by
much of the literature on agency, is that agency is a core element of human
identity, and that human well-being requires the assertion of agency for its

48
See, e.g., PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 131–214; Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally
Ganong Pope, Transformative Mediation: Changing the Quality of Family Conflict
Interaction, DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS
(2004), at 53.
49
See, e.g., Bush, supra note 7, at 739–42 (discussing and citing research on the
prevalence of directive practice in mediation); Dinerstein, supra note 12 passim
(contrasting directive practices in traditional lawyering, counseling and other professions,
with client-centered practices in those professions).
50
See infra text accompanying notes 78–79.
51
See Julia Lerch, et al., The Rise of Individual Agency in Conceptions of Society:
Textbooks Worldwide, 1950–2011, 32 INT’L SOC. 38, 38–54 (2017).
52
See Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, 2 ASIAN J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 23–24 (1999) (adopting a similar definition of agency and a similar
view of its relation to social structure).
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fulfillment.53 That is, agency is not simply a socially constructed concept, it is
an inherent feature of human consciousness or identity; so that the restriction
of agency violates the sense of self that human beings carry, and the support
of agency enables the fulfillment of that sense of self.54 In the words of Joseph
Stulberg, a mediation scholar whose work regularly integrates philosophical
concepts, “[A] person’s capacity to engage in the process of making
such decisions, and to have her choices respected, is essential to her
being; one cannot be a person without making such decisions and
assuming responsibility for their outcome.” 55 In other words, agency is
essential to human personhood, whether in mediation or in general.
Moreover, according to celebrated psychologist Albert Bandura, an
individual’s belief that s/he possesses agency is a necessary condition
for her sense of self-efficacy, which is in turn a prime contributor to her
overall well-being and success in life. 56 This view is consistent with
cross-cultural research from all over the world which documents that
autonomy and the ability to make choices that affect one’s life is a
prime determinant of human wellbeing.57 It is also consistent with
sociological research documenting that people consistently prefer
social processes that afford them high levels of participation and

53

See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 59–62 (citing literature from multiple fields), 250–
56. This is not to say that agency is the only core element of human identity or nature. In
the Promise of Mediation and other key writings on transformative mediation, it was
argued that another core element of human identity is empathy or compassion—and that
full human development involves an integration of agency and empathy. See id. at 59–62.
This Article does not abandon that view. Rather, it argues that the enactment of agency
alone, even if empathy does not follow, is still an essential value and core element of
humanity. Because of the tendency to overlook or undervalue agency, as discussed in this
Article, that argument is the authors’ focus here. See supra text accompanying note 17 and
infra text accompanying note 73. It is worth noting, however, that in any ordering of
essential human values, there is a sound argument that agency is primary, because as
described in the following section, other valued human impacts lose their significance if
they occur without agency but as reactions to other forces.
54
See id. Obviously, this view of agency accepts the notion that human beings do
indeed exist as individuals, although within a social context, and that they are not solely
the consequences or by-products of larger structures, whether economic, political or
otherwise. See Lerch et al., supra note 51.
55
Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 230 (2005).
56
Bandura, supra note 52, at 28–32.
57
See, e.g., B. Ann Bettencourt & Kennon Sheldon, Social Roles as Mechanisms for
Psychological Need Satisfaction Within Social Groups, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L
PSYCHOL. 1131 (2001).
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decision-making.58 In all this work, human agency is “proven” to be
central to human identity.

C. What Agency Facilitates: A Comparison
In fact, however, human agency is not a phenomenon that can
be proven, even with the support of multidisciplinary sources. Even if
studies show that human wellbeing, happiness, efficacy, etc., all require
agency, this could be an effect or perception created by social structures
themselves. Even if research “proves” that agency increases resilience
and strength and diminishes “fragility” and dependency, 59 all this can
be ascribed to the effect of culture or social forces. Indeed, opposed to
the view that agency matters are those arguing that individual choice is
itself a construction, an illusion, and that human beings and their
choices are ultimately products of social forces, environment, brain
wiring, and other factors unrelated to individual agency. 60
In fact, then, there is no way of proving empirically that agency
is an essential element of human nature and consciousness. Rather,
asserting the core value of agency is itself a choice, a belief, an assertion
about how things are or should be. If this is so, how can one make a
convincing case for the importance of valuing agency to anyone who
doesn’t already hold this belief? One suggestion is through a mental
exercise in comparison—through envisioning a world without agency
and a world with agency, and comparing the character of the two, as in
the following discussion.
If agency is dismissed as simply a social construction or
convention, then nothing else in the realm of human conduct is really
meaningful. What difference does it make if empathy is expressed, or
generosity, or courage—or selfishness and cowardice? All are the
58

See, e.g., E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
59
See The Three Great Untruths that are Harming Young Americans, HELEO (Oct.
23,
2018),
https://heleo.com/three-great-untruths-harming-youngamericans/19321/?platform=hootsuite; GREG LUKIANOFF & JONATHAN HAIDT, THE
CODDLING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW GOOD INTENTIONS AND BAD IDEAS ARE SETTING
UP A GENERATION FOR FAILURE 19–32 (2018).
60
See Bandura, supra note 52, at 21–23 (stating that in this view, “People are merely
repositories for past stimulus inputs and conduits for external stimulation, but they can add
nothing to their performance. They undergo actions rather than construct, select, and
regulate them. . . . [S]tripped of consciousness and agentic capability of decision and
action, people are mere automatons undergoing actions devoid of any conscious regulation,
phenomenological life or personal identity.”).
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products of deterministic forces, so what is the significance of these
forms of human conduct? If there is agency, and choice, everything else
has the potential for value and significance. Without agency, there is
no significance and no responsibility—good and evil acts can be
attributed to larger forces, and the individuals performing the acts
deserve neither credit nor blame.
Said differently, without the belief in agency, all action is the
result of compulsion, external or internal. If external, it is the result of
outside forces; if internal, it is the result of irrational impulses or
preferences. Either way, there is no significance or meaning in terms of
individual intention or purpose. So, to envision a world without agency
is to envision a meaningless, chaotic place, devoid of intention, purpose
and meaning. Whereas, with a belief in agency, everything becomes
meaningful and significant—and real. Empathy, generosity, etc. are all
real phenomena, because they are intended and meant, and that is so
because there is an agent behind them choosing and enacting them,
asserting them into the world. The same is true for evil acts. So, there
can be accountability and responsibility. There can be admiration and
there can also be condemnation. All of this is possible when human
agency is present and operating.61 None of it is possible when it is not.
In sum, without agency, no human action is real, all action is an
artifact—like forced recognition in mediation.62 Given all the above,
one can argue that even if agency is not a provable element of human identity,
it makes sense to act as though it is—because this choice to see agency as real
will ultimately construct a more decent, humane, livable world. This
hypothetical comparison should help explain why agency—or the belief in
it—does and should matter deeply.

D. What Agency Itself Represents
However, the above argument supports the value of agency by
reference to the effects that its presence or absence produces. That is, it argues
Psychologist Viktor Frankel, who developed his theory of “logotherapy” while a
prisoner in a Nazi concentration camp, argued that “A human being is not one thing among
others; things determine each other, but man is ultimately self-determining. What he
becomes – within the limits of endowment and environment – he has made out of
himself…. In the concentration camps … we watched and witnessed some of our comrades
behave like swine while others behaved like saints. Man has both potentialities within
himself; which one is actualized depends on decisions but not on conditions.” VIKTOR
FRANKEL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING 133–34 (2006).
62
See supra text accompanying notes 25–31.
61
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for the importance of agency as instrumental to the achievement of other, more
fundamental values: human wellbeing, happiness, efficacy, empathy, etc. It
does not argue or show that human agency has an essential value, in itself and
without reference to its valued effects. To understand the depth of commitment
to agency required in client-centered practices, the essential value of agency
must be understood and recognized. Otherwise, if client-centered practices fail
to achieve the other valued effects, then agency must be restricted in the
pursuit of those other effects. This is the argument that explains the move away
from client self-determination described in Part One of this Article, and welldocumented in mediation and other fields.63 Those who make this move
believe that to achieve empathy, or justice, or even settlement, client agency
can and sometimes must be abandoned.64 However, the authors believe and
argue the reverse—that even if supporting client agency fails to produce these
results, the clients’ exercise of agency has essential value and takes priority in
practice.
Our belief is that when a human being acts with agency, that action
itself has an essential value—whether it is described as being part of human
identify or in some other way. That value is captured, in one sense, by the
terms first used above to define agency— “the assertion by an individual of
the intentional choice to make a decision or take an action.” The term assertion
implies that agency involves a positive action, from within the individual
him/herself, to bring some internal intention into the world. That action, by
definition, is taken freely; it is not a reaction to some external pressure or
force, even if external factors may come into consideration in the decision. 65
63

See supra text accompanying notes 14–33.
In fact, this argument is fallacious, because where any of these other goals are
achieved by imposition and not by party choice, the gains made are illusory. That is,
recognition resulting from mediator pressure is not genuine; justice resulting from
mediator imposition is unlikely to be truly equitable; and settlement/agreement achieved
by mediator pressure is unlikely to be complete and sustainable. Nevertheless, mediators
who do not value agency per se will often engage in impositional practices to “achieve”
these other goals.
65
See Bandura, supra note 52, at 22–23. On his website, Bandura summarizes his
view of agency, which includes elements similar to those mentioned here in the text:
“Agency refers to the human capability to influence one's functioning and the course of
events by one's actions. There are four functions through which human agency is exercised.
One such function is intentionality. People form intentions that include action plans and
strategies for realizing them. The second function involves temporal extension of agency
through forethought. People set themselves goals and foresee likely outcomes of
prospective actions to guide and motivate their efforts anticipatorily. The third agentic
function is self-reactiveness. Agents are not only planners and forethinkers. They are also
64
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The term assertion also implies that the action requires some
motivating energy within the self to bring it about. That is, even where there
is no external pressure that produces a reaction, there are internal barriers or
steps to be overcome before the intention emerges into action. That is implied
by the term intention, which means that there is a gap to be bridged between
the intention itself and the intended result. Those barriers may involve
unclarity about what the intention involves or requires; they may involve
uncertainty about how to express the intention; they may involve doubt about
one’s capacity to carry out the intention.66 Agency represents an assertion of
the self itself that overcomes those barriers and breaks through from an
internal, contemplated intention to an externalized, realized action or
decision.67
In an earlier effort to describe the nature of agency, and in doing so
establish its centrality to human identity, one of the authors wrote, “Agency
involves an outward thrust of the self into the world. It occurs at the nexus of
volition and action: the place where choice and the ability to exercise choice
meets the capacity to act in some fashion.”68 Thus agency includes both choice
and intentional action, both of which are essential to human identity.
Reflecting further on this observation, the authors believe that this description
of agency relates to another deep truth about human beings. Individuals’
identity—the self—is not static and limited, but rather dynamic and

self-regulators. The fourth agentic function is self-reflectiveness. People are not only
agents, they are self-examiners of their own functioning. Through functional selfawareness, they reflect on their personal efficacy, the soundness of their thoughts and
actions, the meaning of their pursuits, and make corrective adjustments if necessary.”
Albert Bandura, Agency, https://albertbandura.com/albert-bandura-agency.html (last
visited July 6, 2020).
66
See id. In transformative mediation theory, barriers like those mentioned in the text
are the “markers” of the weakness of self that characterizes the negative conflict cycle. See
BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 11, at 49–50.
67
For this reason, agentic action is even more significant when it is a response to
barriers from within or without that seem powerful enough to block or frustrate its
expression. The intentional self-assertion needed to break through those barriers comes
from, and calls forth, a deeper level within the self, leading to a fuller expression of the
self. This is one reason why the phenomenon of individuals overcoming a sense of their
own weakness and connecting to their sense of strength—such as the empowerment shift
in transformative mediation—has such a powerful impact on whoever experiences or
witnesses it. Specific examples of this phenomenon, and its powerful impact, are given
below. See infra text accompanying notes 79–87.
68
Peter F. Miller, “Notes on Agency”, manuscript on file with author.
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venturesome.69 The self seeks to develop its full identity and to find expression
in the world.70 And this need of the self to develop, and to bring itself into the
world, is foundational to human nature. Thus, agency matters deeply because
only through its exercise can the human self be constructed and expressed.71
69
See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 251–54 (citing sources from different fields
adopting the view that the self is not static but rather develops and is constructed through
interaction with the world); see also Barbara Gray, The Gender-Based Foundations of
Negotiation Theory, 4 RES. ON NEGOT. ORGS. 3, 24–25, 27–28 (1994) (arguing that
feminist perspectives show that static conceptions of the self are invalid); Dorothy J. Della
Noce, supra note 14, at 275–79.
70
The need for expression accounts for—but is by no means restricted to—the creative
impulse; and it accounts for the lonely stances artists sometimes take in support of or in
defense of their work. Bob Dylan’s refusal to accede to the impassioned wishes of his fan
base provides an example of an artist standing by his work, even leaning back into a sea of
disapproval and opprobrium. As a folk singer Bob Dylan swiftly came to be one of the
very foremost voices of youth and the counterculture. He performed within the established
traditions of folk music by using an acoustic guitar and without being accompanied by
percussion. That changed at the Newport Festival of 1965. He came on stage with an
electric guitar accompanied by rock musicians who provided a rock underpinning to his
songs. This evolution into what came to be called folk/rock dismayed his audience. People
saw it as selling out to commercialism, and as a betrayal. (An apocryphal story circulated,
much believed at the time, that Pete Seeger, an older icon of folk music, tried to cut Dylan’s
electric guitar cord during the performance.) Not deterred, Dylan persisted in his new style.
Controversy dogged Dylan when he toured Europe the next year. One moment epitomizes
the fan base’s response to the change in Dylan’s music and his defiant response to that. At
a concert in England, Dylan is greeted by a cascade of booing as he comes on stage
accompanied by back- up musicians. (One concert goer is reputed to have yelled,
“Judas!”). Dylan turns to one of the band members and can be heard to say, “Play it f***ing
loud.” The scene is captured in Martin Scorsese’s 2005 documentary. NO DIRECTION
HOME: BOB DYLAN (Paramount Pictures 2005).
71
See Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 691, 709–10 (2001) (citing the philosophical view that “the self is not obvious to the
self,” but must be discovered or constructed.) But what is meant here by the self? To
receive a fatal prognosis and go to pieces certainly qualifies as informing the world with
one’s innerness. But to fall apart in the face of adversity is not to exert agency; rather it is
to lose touch with it. The self, as we envision and use the term, means the intended self:
who it is we wish to be and how it is we wish to comport ourselves. So, to extend the
example of the fatal prognosis, agency would apply to the patient’s heroic efforts to regain
composure after the diagnosis. And the force driving agency would be the intended self’s
need or desire to meet adversity well. Frankel’s account of life in a concentration camp
reflects a similar view of agency: “Every day, every hour, offered the opportunity to make
a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to those
powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom; which
determined whether or not you would become the plaything of circumstance, renouncing
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In short, agency is the phenomenon of the self’s identifying and
expressing the self, and as such it is at the core of human identity and
consciousness. The assertion of agency, in other words, is one essential
meaning of being human. That is the value of agency—an essential value—
regardless of whether it achieves some other specific impact in the external
world.72
To return to the original subject of this Article: This kind of assertion
of agency is what occurs in mediation when a party makes an entirely selfdetermined decision—and it occurs whether or not that decision leads to
settlement, justice, recognition, or any other valued end.73 It is an end in itself,
freedom and dignity to become molded into the form of the typical inmate.” FRANKEL,
supra note 61, at 66. He also recognizes the role of agency in developing the self in relation
to external conditions, even in the camp: “Man is not fully conditioned and determined but
rather determines himself whether he gives in to conditions or stands up to them. In other
words, man is ultimately self-determining. Man … decides what his existence will be, what
he will become in the next moment…. [O]ne of the main features of human existence is
the capacity to rise above [biological, psychological or sociological] conditions, to grow
beyond them.” Id., at 131.
72
This is not to say that agency is the only essential value, or the only essential
meaning of being human; another core element is empathy or compassion. See supra notes
17 and 53; infra note 73. But that element is not the focus in this Article, for reasons
explained there. See id.
73
For a concrete example of this phenomenon, see infra note 90. It may seem to some
readers that our emphasis on client agency as a stand-alone value, regardless of whether it
leads to other impacts, including recognition shifts and understanding, constitutes a shift
from the relational character of transformative theory, and moves toward an individualist
framework. That is, the focus on agency as stand-alone value means that the process will
be aimed at increasing individuals’ self-defined satisfaction without regard to other, which
is characteristic of the individualist theory underlying the conventional problem-solving,
facilitative model. See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 239–47. However, this is neither the
intent nor the impact of our “stand-alone” agency argument. If success is measured by
increases in party agency—through parties exercising self-determination during the
process even though no other result is achieved—this is far from the equivalent of an
individualist framework. That framework is based on the view that satisfaction of
individuals’ self-defined needs is the goal of conflict processes, whether that satisfaction
is produced by self-determination or expert imposition. The outcome is valued, not some
aspect of the process itself. That is one key difference between the problem-solving and
the transformative frameworks, and the focus on client agency as stand-alone value retains
that difference by holding that process rather than outcome is what matters. Second,
although our sole focus on self-determination and agency seems to omit the second element
in the relational framework—the other-oriented value of empathy/understanding—that too
is neither the intent nor the impact of our argument. As noted repeatedly above, our claim
is that agency is an essential value, not that it is the only essential value. Moreover, our
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and because that is so, supporting client agency in mediation is of central
importance, and trumps any other possible goal that the process might be used
to achieve. In exploring our own commitment to self-determination in
mediation, this is what the authors of the Article have realized about our
deeper, underlying commitment to the value of agency: it is a supreme value
that is either served or disserved by mediators, depending on how fully they
support client decisionmaking. This realization is all the more important
because of another dimension related to this discussion: the institutional
context surrounding the practice of mediation and other client-centered
processes.

E. The Stakes in Choosing to Value Agency
Another important factor that strengthens our commitment to the
principle of client self-determination is the restriction of the space given for
agency to function, in our current societal environment. That is, the
organization of social processes, and especially the organization of
professional expertise, makes the assertion of agency very difficult and almost
impossible in many contexts. This obviously comes back to the specific
subject of this Article, disregard for client agency in mediation. But beyond
mediation, there is also a robust body of literature documenting, and
criticizing, the culture of expertise that dominates many so-called “helping
professions”—including law, medicine, counseling, education, and others. In
definition and explanation of agency makes clear that agents can only identify and
construct their self-definition through engagement with the world—including interactions
with others, in conflict and otherwise. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
Finally, focusing on self-determination per se in no way suggests that parties will not
exercise their power of choice to give consideration to the perspective of the other, and in
doing so enact the value of empathy—based on party choice. So, the interactional focus of
both the relational theory and the transformative model is not undermined at all by our
argument – it is simply not the focus here. And the reason for that, also explained above,
is that unless stand-alone value is ascribed to agency, intervenors will feel justified in
undermining agency in order to pursue other values when self-determination “doesn’t
work”—that is, doesn’t work as an instrument to achieve those other values. We have been
down that road for many decades in the mediation field, and this Article is an attempt to
prevent continuing further down that misguided path. The importance of clarifying the
stand-alone value of agency is thus both rhetorical and practical—this clarification makes
it much clearer why self-determination really is a supreme value, and at the same time
makes it hard if not impossible to rationalize and justify mediator incursions on party selfdetermination. If self-determination is the heart of mediation, the argument offered in this
Article offers the best chance of preserving and strengthening that heart—and the very life
of the mediation process.
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all these professions, the outside expert—lawyer, doctor, therapist, educator,
or mediator—traditionally assumes a place of authority that automatically
shrinks the realm of client agency, and many assume that this is the proper
state of affairs.74 This dominant culture of expertise makes the value of agency
even more important to assert and explain, because it is a “minority” value that
must fight for its place in society and in peoples’ consciousness. In short,
because agency is often disregarded, and the opportunity for exercising it is so
limited, asserting its value becomes correspondingly more important. That is
certainly part of what has driven the commitment of the authors to make their
claims about the value of agency.
The larger societal consequences of professional disregard for client
agency are hard to overstate. When clients are denied agency by “experts”,
they come to doubt their own capacity for agency in general. A self-fulfilling
prophecy then takes over. In families, workplaces, communities, and civic life
generally, people flounder in the face of problems and challenges, and they
fail to realize and activate their own capacity for working through those
challenges. The result is a culture of reliance on outside “helpers” and experts,
in which people forfeit control over their own lives. 75
In a democratic society the results of that forfeiture cannot be
overstated. Can we really be surprised by this moment in which our society
finds itself—in which people view decisions that affect their lives as being
foisted on them by detached or malign elites, in which theories of conspiracy
abound, and in which there is broad skepticism of knowledge itself? The
destructive impacts of inequalities in income to both individuals and societies

74

See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 12, at 504, 506; see also supra notes 17–19
(regarding the weight given to professional expertise in traditional legal and medical
practice); supra note 173 passim (regarding the weight given to professional expertise in
traditional psychology practice). Dinerstein’s article is an exhaustive examination of the
conceptual and practical differences between the traditional, expert-centered approach to
practice, and the client-centered approach, in different fields, and at many different levels.
75
An interesting example of this disregard for agency’s value has surfaced in the
authors’ classes, when the subject of agency is discussed. Every year, a hypothetical deal
is offered to the students: the student will surrender to the professor all decisionmaking
power over his/her life for one year, and if the student does not agree at year’s end that
their life is categorically better than if s/he had made his/her own decisions, the professor
will pay a million dollars. Each year more than half the class accepts the hypothetical deal
and surrenders their agency to the professor. Why? Because the culture of expertise has
inculcated in the students the belief that the “expert” will get better results than they will
on their own and the exercise of agency in itself—even their own agency—does not hold
great enough value for them to resist the deal.
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have been studied and documented. But what of the unevenly suffered harms
that result from deficits—and inequities—in agency? 76
As argued in the Promise of Mediation, the stakes of rejecting agency
in mediation are thus far greater than the impact on that field—they may
ultimately contribute to a decline in the self-governing and democratic
character of the society as a whole. However, it is equally true that accepting
and enacting the value of agency in mediation can contribute to strengthening
the society’s commitment to democratic processes and institutions, and the
capacity of the citizenry to make those structures work. In Promise, that
positive impact was identified as one of the public values of transformative
mediation, and that value is as important today as it was 25 years ago.77 It is
also deserving of more widespread recognition and support, especially if we
expect mediation to help us “navigate in a polarized era.”78 Mediators can help
do that by supporting the agency of diverse parties in deciding for themselves
whether and when to see each other more favorably, rather than using directive
practices to “get them” to do so. Freely chosen understanding can help bridge
divides; “forced recognition” will only widen them. Supporting human agency
in mediation and similar processes can be a first step in addressing
polarization.

76

The literature on client-centered lawyering raises this question explicitly and
implicitly, in stressing the special importance of client agency for poor, disadvantaged and
disempowered clients. See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE
CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 168–69 (1974) (stating that client-centered
lawyering is intended to “promote[] the dignity of citizens as clients[,] . . . make[] the client
a doer, responsible for his choices[,] . . . [and] increase[] the chance[s] for [the] client . . .
achieving a measure of control over [his] own life . . . .”); Alizabeth Newman, Bridging
the Justice Gap: Building Community by Responding to Individual Need, 17 CLIN. L. REV.
615, 627–31 (2011) (arguing that “if the lawyering process is to be an effective tool for
social justice, the means cannot be inconsistent with the ultimate goals,” and suggesting
that the client should be treated as “a vital partner, from the very outset,” and supporting
“[t]he conception of the lawyer as coach and the client as a capable partner.”); Rand, supra
note 12, at 485 (citing the social workers’ ethical code provision that “[p]eople empower
themselves and our job is to assist them” and arguing that social justice lawyering must be
based on the same principle).
77
See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 80–83.
78
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. See also Erik Cleven, Robert A.
Baruch Bush & Judith A. Saul, Living with No: Political Polarization and Transformative
Dialogue, 2018 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 56–62 (2018) (describing transformative interventions
in several polarized communities). The subject of the Symposium that generated this
Article was the potential for mediation (and ADR) to help in “navigating in a polarized
era.”
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PART THREE: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING THE VALUE OF
AGENCY
A. Lights at the End of the Tunnel: Portraits of Agency in
Transformative Mediation

At the same time as agency is restricted and disfavored by many
current social and professional structures, the value of agency has found
powerful expression and support in client-centered practices in some
professions—including transformative mediation. Despite the serious
challenges discussed in this Article, cases reported by transformative
mediators confirm how parties value and seize the opportunity the process
gives them to assert their own agency in the face of disempowering situations.
Transformative theory recognizes the corrosive impact that conflict
has on people’s capacity to exert agency. In the midst of conflict, parties
become less clear in their thinking, less able to articulate their thoughts, less
able to process and make decisions, and less confident of their own efficacy.
Transformative theory also recognizes that this state of weakness is
existentially discomfiting to disputants, to such a degree that, if properly
supported in mediation, they will make every effort to recapture those essential
attributes of agency, even as they contend with one another. 79 The following
vignettes, drawn from actual mediation cases, use the voices of parties to
demonstrate that people in conflict place great importance on the need to
sustain or regain their agency in transformative mediation.80

1. SOMETHING WORTH PRAYING FOR
Some years ago, one of the authors mediated a dispute between two
managers in a business. For many years they worked closely, each with the
same level of institutional authority and status. Then one of them was
promoted, and the other became subordinate because he now reported directly
to his former equal. The new arrangement so toxified their professional
relationship that the subordinate manager filed a discrimination complaint
against his new boss. The company they worked for has an internal process
79

See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 49–53.
It is important to note that, in each of the mediation vignettes in this section, and
each of the film scenes in the following section, the story shows the essential and
independent value of agency, without any further effect needing to occur. For further
discussion of the significance of this point, see infra note 90.
80
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with which to handle complaints of discrimination. People filing complaints
may opt for mediation as a potential means of resolving their issues. Mediation
is mandatory for managers named in complaints.
In this case, there was a third manager
present in the mediation that resulted from
the subordinate’s decision to mediate the
matter. Both the boss and the subordinate had
requested his presence. In introducing
himself and describing his role in the
mediation, this manager said, “I’m not here
to help one of these guys right a wrong. They
are both nice guys and I am here in support
of both of them.” The mediation that ensued
was satisfactory to both boss and
subordinate. In its aftermath, probably
because of the presence of the third manager,
the three engaged in a conversation of the
sort that mediators seldom are privileged to
hear. Disputants rarely articulate the feelings
and thoughts they had experienced as they
anticipated their approaching mediation.
Here each of the two disputants did precisely
that. Each related that they had gone to
church after work the day before the
mediation. Each had prayed. Each asked for
the ability to be firm and clear in mediation
the following morning. In sum, rather than
focus on a desired outcome, each disputant
asked that he not lose the capacity to act with
agency, in a situation that each clearly saw as
an imminent challenge that would require
him to draw on reserves in order to surmount.
Little commentary is required here. Clearly conflict can be formidable and
daunting because the experience of conflict challenges one’s human
capacities. Clearly the ability to meet the adversity of conflict with one’s
capacities at their best is something that matters to people. And clearly
retaining or regaining those capacities is hard. In moments of great challenge,
people do not pray for the inconsequential. What mattered to the parties here
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was their agency. That is what they prayed for, and this mediation allowed and
helped them to maintain it.

2. THE VALUE OF VOICE
One of the authors had a partner for many years with whom he
mediated issues of divorce and other family matters. This case is drawn from
that experience.
On a particular day the author’s partner,
Sarah, found herself in our locality’s
Supreme Court. She was there representing
an association of mediators whose practices
include divorce and sundry disputes that
occur within families. The association had
placed mediators at the Court’s disposal that
day in response to a joint initiative by the
court system and various mediation groups
called Mediation Appreciation Day.
Mediation Appreciation Day is an annual one
day event which attempts to demonstrate the
capabilities of mediation to court personnel,
principally judges and to litigators as well
who happen to be in Court that day. The case
the judge selected for mediation was a
divorce case that was set to go to trial that
afternoon. The judge literally threw the
case’s bundled paperwork to Sarah and
ordered the spouses to “Go with the mediator
and try to work this out” (A room had been
set aside for mediation.) Those readers
familiar with divorce will understand just
how remote the possibility was of the spouses
“working out” their issues. Few divorce
actions get on court calendars; only a fraction
of those cases actually go to trial. So, this
husband and wife were among a small cohort
of spouses whose issues had proved
intractable in negotiation, whether conducted
directly or through attorneys, or in mediation.
Adding to the unlikelihood of resolution was
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the utter absence of choice by the spouses
regarding the selection of mediation as a
means of potential resolution.
Since Sarah is a transformative mediator, she
gave the spouses the option of just sitting for
a length of time rather than attempting to
mediate their differences. After a short
discussion the spouses opted for mediation,
in effect saying, “As long as we have to be
here, we might as well try.” And so, they
opened a discussion of their issues. Their
conversation
was
notable
for
its
contentiousness and acrimony. Each spouse
staked out ground and held it, often in
spirited fashion. Neither moved an inch. In
the words of another client of one of the
authors, who is unrelated to this story, “They
agreed to disagree about everything. They
resolved nothing.” After an hour or so of
sustained disagreement the spouses decided
to suspend the mediation and return their case
to the Court so as not to delay their trial.
The wife happened to see Sarah an hour or so
later as Sarah was leaving the Courthouse.
The wife crossed the wide corridor that
separated them and proffered her hand. When
Sarah gave the wife her hand, the wife said,
“I want to thank you. I found my voice.”
To be without a voice is crippling to the sense of agency.81 The self is
imprisoned and therefore incomplete. And finding one’s voice is powerful and
restorative. These spouses were contending over the distribution of their
marital assets. For the authors, this story raises the question, “What is worth
more, gaining a greater share of assets, or gaining one’s voice, one’s agency?”
For the wife here, the answer was clear. Parties value their agency, and they
value a process that supports it. They find that in transformative mediation.

81

See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.

625

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 35:5 2020]

3. DOING SOMETHING
A young man, in his early to mid-20s, had agreed to participate in
mediation at the request of a young woman of comparable age. Both the young
man and young woman are deaf. Mediation had been suggested to the young
woman by a staff member of a social agency—both the young people were
long standing clients—which offers an array of services to the deaf
community. The local community mediation center which had offered to host
the young people’s mediation provided an interpreter, fluent in American Sign
Language. One of the authors of this Article was the mediator.
When the mediator invited the two young
people to open their conversation, it was the
young woman who chose to speak. She
unfolded a lengthy narrative, the theme of
which was the history and status of their
relationship. She spoke at length of the value
she placed on having been in emotional
partnership with the young man. How his
support and simply being with him had
permitted her new insights into the motives
that had governed the poor decisions she had
made in the past. And how his support and
being connected with him had equipped her
with a deeper knowledge of herself, so that
she had at last been able to take steps to
stabilize her life, which had to that point been
chaotic and disjointed. In continuing, the
young woman spoke of the discomfort the
young man’s uncommunicativeness had
caused her in their past and was especially
causing her now. Even when things were
going well between them, she said, his failure
to communicate his feelings about her had
caused her pain. He had never told her he
loved her, had never said that he valued being
in connection with her. Now, she was hearing
from others in the community that the young
man had told them that she and he “were no
longer an item.” She wanted him to know
that, while still loving him, she could accept
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the end of their relationship if he told her that
he wanted to end it. Painful as the ending
would be, what was more hurtful was not
knowing. And the awareness that he had been
voluble about her with others, while
remaining silent with her, was both hurtful
and degrading.
Although the theme of the relationship
occupied most of her narrative there were
two other topics the young woman touched
on. She was about to enroll in an in-patient
course of therapy and counseling in order to
address a persistent drug problem. The
course of treatment was to run for six weeks.
She had a court date immediately after its
conclusion. She was to appear as a
respondent in a custody action by the father
of her young daughter—clearly she
envisioned Court as an ordeal through which
she had to pass. Would the young man
support and accompany her, whether as mate
or merely in the capacity of a friend? And
there was the matter of her car. The young
man had borrowed it and while driving had
gotten into an accident. He had reimbursed
her for the initial estimate of $3,000.00, but
it turned out that the actual cost of repairs had
been $6,000.00. Would he make up for the
shortfall?
The young man had been attentive and
connected by his gaze to the young woman
throughout all she had said. But during this
lengthy time, he had remained silent. At
several points when the young woman had
paused in her narrative, the author/mediator
had asked the young man whether there were
things he wished to raise, or did he prefer to
just listen? The young man always answered,
“I’ll just listen.” At one point, the young man
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asked if we could take a break so he could
exit the building in order to smoke a
cigarette. The young woman opted to join
him. When they returned some 20 minutes
later, there was a markedly different quality
in the young man’s bearing and affect,
manifest even before he spoke. He seemed at
once lighter, yet more solid and present, and
possessed of greater vitality. When he did
speak, he told the author, “We worked it out.”
A few minutes later the young woman and
young man responded to the author’s
question “Have you had a complete
conversation or is there anything else you
want to say.” She spoke aloud for the first
time in the session; directing her gaze to the
young man, she said, “It feels like we did a
lot today.” The young man answered her,
also aloud, by saying, without a trace of
theatricality or even emphasis, “Yeah, for the
first time in my life.” He then shifted his gaze
to the author and said, “I like mediation.”
Here the authors invite the reader to pause for a moment. If you can, imagine
yourself, perhaps because of disability, perhaps not, as never having acquired
the certain knowledge that you have the capacity to undertake doing things,
and doing them well. In fact, if you can, imagine yourself as never having had
the experience of having truly done something. Now picture yourself as having
moved yourself, through the act and experience of doing, to a clear knowledge
that you do indeed possess those powers—you have agency. Think of the
difference that self-knowledge might make as you conduct your life going
forward. You too might then find mediation an affirmation, as this couple did.
In fact, this episode was salutary for the author/mediator as well, because it
struck a resonant chord of memory. It was precisely the sort of dynamic change
in clients, exhibited here by the young man—sometimes expressed physically,
sometimes in words—that had drawn the author’s attention years before.
Those changes strongly suggested that there were benefits to clients inherent
in the process of doing mediation that were of value and were independent of
outcomes. It was the cumulative effect of those earlier, increasingly pressing
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observations that had led the author to explore transformative practice, and
ultimately to adopt it, in order to support human agency in mediation.

4. SAYING NO
The following episode taught one of the authors a lesson about choice
that may also have contributed to his transition to the transformative mode of
practice. The mediation had been referred from Family Court. The petitioner
- the father in a dispute over visitation—was a man in his late thirties or early
forties. The respondent—the mother of the two girls who were the subjects of
the petition—was a woman a few years his junior, in her mid to late thirties.
Shortly after fathering the two children, the
man had entered into a marriage with another
woman and had two other children with her.
During the life of the marriage, the father,
had been fiscally dutiful in a consistent way
in supporting his two older children. Yet
during this time he had expressed no interest
in reviving a relationship with them. Indeed,
he had gone a number of years without any
sort of contact with these children, now about
eight and nine years old. Recently the
father’s marriage had ended in divorce. With
the end of the marriage there came a change
in the father. He had become passionately
interested in connecting with his two older
children. Some months before, he had
reached out to their mother and asked if he
could come to her home to become
reacquainted with their children. The mother
had welcomed this surprising initiative
because the two children, although they had
scant memory of their father, frequently
asked about him. She understood that her two
girls badly missed the presence of a father.
The father’s initial visit had gone well all
around. So had all the subsequent visits. The
two girls and their father were clearly
developing a connection that, from the
mother’s perspective, enriched the well-
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being of her children. By the time the parents
were in Court, the father had been visiting the
children in their home for some months.
The parents’ differences arose over whether
the children could have overnight visits in
their father’s home. The father insisted on
their being able to do so. The mother
objected. Later, in negotiation, the mother
had somewhat modified the position she had
initially adopted. She stipulated that, if things
continued to go well, they could revisit the
question of overnight visits in six months or
so. The father had continued to insist on
immediate overnights. As do many fathers,
he regarded the discretion the mother was
attempting to exert as diminishing his status
and prerogative as co-parent.
Now they were in mediation. The author had
initiated a separate meeting with the mother.
The stance she had adopted regarding
visitation seemed to the author/mediator to
be untenable in a legal sense, and he had
wanted to explore that with her. Here the
mother became expansive. She explained
why she had adopted and committed to her
stance. She said, “I understand how
important his connection with my children is
to them and I don’t want to interfere with it.
But right after each of the children were born,
the father (she used his name) urged me to
give them to his sister to raise. His sister lives
in the Dominican Republic. We (meaning the
United States) have no treaty with them about
unlawful flight, so if he ever does get them to
the D.R. they will never see me again.”
She concluded, “I’ve met with a lawyer. I
know I am going to lose the case, because of
the father’s legal rights. But if my children
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are going to lose their mother, it will happen
because someone else permitted it to happen,
(referring to the Court), not because I failed
to protect them. I will not participate in that.”
There was such dignity and calm, such clarity
and purpose in what she said, that it stopped
cold any incipient desire by the author to ask
her for any reconsideration or moderation of
the stance she had taken and held.
As we have suggested earlier in positing choice as a requisite for meaningful
action, our participation only has value when we have the option of not
participating; and our yeses only have meaning when we have the power to
say no. Sometimes the self needs to hold itself in opposition, even with the
knowledge that it is powerless to alter an outcome. Doing so is an eloquent
expression of agency, and that was the heart of what happened in this
mediation and the others reported on above.

B. Lights at the End of the Tunnel: The Value of Agency in
Popular Culture
In teaching our courses on mediation, the authors have found that even
when students notice the empowerment shifts that clients make, they
underestimate the value these experiences have to clients—because the
students find it hard to believe that agency really matters so much to people.
In order to overcome this skepticism, we have increasingly turned to popular
culture, narrative history, and realms unrelated to mediation. We have used
stories from these realms as a vehicle to illustrate the importance of agency in
peoples’ lives.
Unlike the actual world which unfolds willy-nilly, events in drama and
film are structured by the dramatist’s need to stir his or her audience. In drama
and film, events and characters’ responses to events are purposely sequenced
so as to inspire emotion in viewers. Drama and film achieve those sorts of
impacts because dramatists and directors have the power to create the world—
that is, they can structure what the viewer sees and when s/he sees it in ways
that support the development of unified and powerful themes.
Human agency is one such dramatically powerful and compelling
theme, and for that reason it is repeatedly the subject of popular films. It is
always heroically depicted: a protagonist is confronted by a challenge or series
of challenges, he or she struggles with fear, or doubt or the inability to move
forward as they wish to or need to, then he or she connects with internal
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resources, and ultimately emerges from the struggle with new strength.
Incidentally, that heroic progression from weakness to strength mirrors that of
conflict participants as they move through mediation.
The authors believe that agency—its loss or potential loss, and then its
assertion—has the power to deeply move audiences again and again, precisely
because it is an essential part of our nature. In support of that belief, the authors
present here a few short synopses of films in which protagonists who face
challenges, nevertheless find and assert agency and in doing so, become
stronger and gain the audience’s admiration.82 Recounting these stories here,
together with comments on how we see agency demonstrated in them, will
reinforce our exposition of the value of agency in earlier sections of the
article—and suggest how skepticism about that value can be overcome.

1. A RASH ACTION, OR A DELIBERATE CHOICE
The 2004 film “Crash” depicts a series of confrontations faced by a
group of unrelated characters in a tense urban environment. 83 One of the
characters is an urbane, African–American film director, Cameron Thayer,
married to an attractive and demanding woman, also African–American.
The couple is driving home from an award
celebration, in evening clothes, in a brandnew black SUV, when they are pulled over
by police. There is no reason for the stop, but
the senior officer is a racist who uses the
occasion to taunt Cameron and sexually
fondle his wife, before letting them go “with
a warning.” Cameron submits to this abuse
rather than suffer arrest and jail, but his wife
is enraged at his cowardice in not standing up
to the cop, and she berates him mercilessly
when they get home. The following day, on
the set of his film, Cameron is criticized by
his white producer because one of the actors
has not used a “black” accent in a scene, and
although Cameron objects that he knows
what black people talk like, the producer
82

See supra note 67.
Anonymousones, Crash Movie Clip,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQ6RSu8dhPU.
83
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forces him to re-do the scene. Through all
this, Cameron is diminished, disrespected,
and even degraded publicly. Finally, driving
home from the studio, he is the victim of an
attempted carjacking by two teen-aged black
kids, one with a gun. As they struggle for
control of the gun and the car, a patrolling
police car notices them; Cameron wrests the
gun from the teen and tries to drive away, but
the police catch up and block his escape.
They order him with a bullhorn to exit the car
with his hands up, while the teen hides from
view on the floor of the front seat.
Cameron sits for several moments thinking,
while the bullhorn blasts its orders. Then he
deliberately tucks the gun into his belt under
his sweater and steps out of the car cursing
and yelling at the police, all the while using
an exaggerated “black” street-talk accent.
Eventually, finding he has no record, the
police allow him to leave, and he drives
away. Stopping some distance away, he
hands the gun back to the teen—who has
hidden from view the entire time—and says
to the teen, without a street accent and in a
firm, calm voice: “You disrespect me; you
disrespect yourself.” And he drives off,
leaving the teen standing on the street in
wonder at what has happened.
This scene can be viewed in different ways, as was likely the intention
of the director. But the most compelling interpretation is that Cameron, having
been subjected to several, successive withering assaults on his self-respect—
from the cop, his own wife, his producer, and now the teen—firmly decides
that he will not continue his submissive attitude, but will take affirmative
control of the situation in the best way he can manage. So, he removes the gun
from the teen’s reach, and then steps out and dramatically confronts the police,
hoping they will focus on him and overlook the teen and hoping that he can
successfully end the confrontation that he has intentionally begun. He does all
this, and then leaves the teen with a powerful challenge —stop disrespecting
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others and yourself. On this interpretation of the scene, the character of
Cameron asserts his agency in a most powerful way, despite the risks involved
and the constraints of his situation. The scene, one of the most gripping in a
film full of dramatic scenes, affects the audience profoundly precisely because
it presents a striking example of the assertion of human agency in the most
challenging circumstances—and where this assertion derives its value from
the act itself, rather than from any other impact it might have. A human being
expresses his agency, and audiences understand the value embodied in this act.

2. A CHOICE TO CHANGE
Even in lighthearted films, human agency is found at the heart of the
story and at its critical moments. The film “Little Miss Sunshine” portrays a
largely dysfunctional family on a quixotic trip to help the 10-year old daughter,
Olive, enter a pre-teen beauty pageant to improve her self-image.84 The family
includes teenaged older brother Dwayne, a self-styled intellectual who has
sworn not to talk, since his opinion is that no one in his family is worth talking
to. Dwayne’s dream is to enlist in the Airforce when he’s 18, and become a jet
pilot, and he can hardly wait.
The whole family is driving in their old VW
van on the way to the beauty pageant, and
Olive is testing Dwayne on math problems
and other items on the Airforce admission
test. She shows him a test to determine visual
acuity, but he fails to see the letters
embedded in the colored images on the page.
She and his uncle declare together, “Dwayne,
you’re color-blind!” At this, Dwayne totally
loses self-control, begins screaming and
pounding on the windows and sides of the
van trying to get out, and the family has to
stop and let him out. His uncle explains to the
shocked family that his colorblindness
disqualifies Dwayne from ever being a jet
pilot! Meanwhile, Dwayne jumps out and
runs down the embankment at the side of the
Starpaw7, Little Miss Sunshine- Dwayne’s Meltdown, YOUTUBE (Jun. 5, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcLlq4Lml7A; cjtobolski22, Little Miss Sunshine
Hug
Scene,
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
19,
2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJT_pAYaWB8.
84
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road, screaming and cursing, and sits in a
field at the bottom, shaking and sobbing. He
rejects approaches from his mother, uncle
and father, waving them off or ignoring them,
and they are stymied. Then little sister Olive
climbs down the hill, approaches him
silently, sits down next to him, and puts her
head on his shoulder. A few minutes pass,
and then Dwayne speaks to her, and simply
says, “OK, let’s go.” They get up and he
carries her up the hill, apologizes to his
family, and they all get in the van and
continue the trip, with Dwayne now engaging
in normal communication with everyone.
Audiences are universally affected by this portrayal of Dwayne’s sudden
emotional disintegration and then, his equally sudden shift to calmness and
“normalcy”. However his shift, though sudden, is not reactive or automatic. It
is clear that his time sitting at the bottom of the hill, after the screaming and
cursing, has been spent in thought and deliberation; and he has realized that
his jet-pilot dream is over. He sees that there is no point to sitting in the field
and delaying his family’s journey, and instead he must swallow hard and go
on with the trip, and with life. Dwayne’s decisions to get up, climb the hill
with Olive, and re-join the family, enact self-determined choices about how to
confront the unexpected and drastic alteration of his life prospects. His
character displays an essential quality of agency that operates in all
circumstances, and which is central to his identity. So lost aspirations do not
fundamentally disable him from asserting himself, making choices, and
moving forward. Witnessing this act of agency is what makes audiences find
this scene so powerful and affecting. They recognize the value of human
agency that it portrays.

3. A REDEMPTION THROUGH AGENCY
In an important sense, the assertion of agency is always redemptive—
redeeming the self from the internal and external constraints that block its
expression in the world. In “The Shawshank Redemption,” a film about a
middle-class accountant wrongly convicted of murdering his wife,85 agency is
85

Iqbal Ali, Shawshank Redemption Tarring Roof Scene with English Closed
Captions, YOUTUBE (Jul. 13, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMuam1MObtI.
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redemptive in the simple factual sense, when it leads Andy Dufresne from
degradation in prison, to gradually reclaiming his capacity for decision and
action, and ultimately to his freedom.
Thrown from a respected professional post
into a situation of forced labor as a prisoner
in a maximum security prison, Andy is
working under harsh physical conditions and
witnessing the brutality of the guards who
supervise the work. One sweltering summer
day he and his fellow inmates are covering
the roof of a prison building with hot tar,
while guards watch and taunt them. Andy
overhears the head guard talking to the others
angrily about property he inherited which,
after the state takes a big “cut” in fees and
taxes, will leave him with a pittance. After a
few minutes listening, Andy drops his broom
and walks straight over to the guards. His
fellow inmates are shocked, as are guards,
who instantly confront him with guns drawn.
The head guard grabs Andy and pulls him to
the edge of the roof, threatening to throw him
off for coming too close to the guards.
However, Andy remains calm and manages
to say, “I can help you get all that money.”
The head guard pulls Andy back from the
edge, and Andy says, “Do you trust your
wife?” The guard almost explodes at him, but
Andy explains, with the guard’s hand on his
throat, that if he trusts her he can make the
inheritance a gift to her and they will keep it
all. The next day, after a check with the IRS
proves that Andy’s advice is true, the guard
asks Andy what he wants in payment for the
advice. Still tarring the roof in the heat with
his fellows, Andy responds, “Cold beer for
all of us,” and amazingly, the guards bring
the beer for the inmates. From that moment
in
the
film,
with
the
guard’s
recommendation, Andy advances little by
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little to become the accountant for the
Warden, who uses his skills to embezzle
funds from the state. Eventually Andy uses
the trust he develops with the Head Guard
and the Warden to escape—leaving evidence
behind of the Warden’s illegal activities.
The scene described here is the dramatic turning point of this film, not because
of the grave threat to Andy’s life from the guard, but because of the powerful
impact of Andy’s deliberate decision to risk his life to gain the head guard’s
confidence by using his expert knowledge, which was rendered useless in
prison until now. In the moments before Andy rises to approach the guards,
we see him noticing and listening to their conversation, thinking it over, and
then deciding to act. From his situation as a helpless prisoner, Andy asserts
himself to reclaim his self-respect and his place as a knowledgeable
professional, and to use them strategically to gain a reward for his fellow
prisoners and a long-term relationship with the Head Guard that leads to his
“redemption”. Until this point in the film, Andy has been the hapless victim
of circumstance—his wife’s murder, a prosecutor’s failure to consider
exculpatory evidence, and the prison system’s brutal character. Despite all
this, Andy’s agency remains intact, and it resurfaces at this point in the film—
and continues to lead him through the remainder of the film to navigate his
way out of the prison and to freedom. Audiences appreciate and admire Andy
for this assertion of human agency and enjoy the triumph over circumstance
and helplessness that it entails. The phenomenon of human agency is the real
“star” of this film.

4. A POWERLESS KING
The King’s Speech is a dramatized account of the struggles of the
young man whom circumstance forced to ascend to the throne as George VI.86
Unlike his assured and socially facile older brother, Edward VIII, George VI
had been from childhood introverted, shy, socially awkward, and badly
incapacitated by what amounted to paralytic stuttering. The film begins at a
moment in which the possibility of Edward’s abdication has become
increasingly imminent.

Movieclips, The King’s Speech (11/12) Movie CLIP - I have a Voice!(2010) HD,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7131IkiSCg.
86
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George (who by all accounts had always
shunned the glare of public life) is confronted
by the daunting possibility of being thrust
into the role of Head of State. And that role
has become especially demanding because
tensions in Europe have been escalating, and
the possibility of war is looming large. In
sum, a young man who had always eschewed
the focus that fame confers, and the demands
that such focus requires, and who cannot
speak with normal fluency, knows that,
despite his fears, he must reconfigure himself
because he might have to become a very
public leader in a moment that is critical to
the life of the nation. He simply has to master
the ability to speak. For help George turns to
Lionel Logue, an Australian speech therapist.
(Logue, a commoner, and Australian to boot,
is considered an unsuitable source of support
by much of George’s circle.) In the world
constructed by directors, the protagonist’s
passage from weak to strong begins with a
moment, dramatically highlighted, in which
the protagonist hits bottom. In this film, such
a pivotal moment takes place after an
extended period in which Logue’s efforts and
George’s efforts to make a dent in his
difficulty have been without result. The
stuttering is as bad as ever; it seems to be
immovable. Now Logue, lounging on a seat
George usually occupies, imitates and mocks
George’s failed attempts to express even a
few words, so disabling is his stuttering at
that moment. Both desperate and furious,
George transcends decorum and yells. And in
yelling, he manages to overcome his
stuttering and express a short, but fluent
sentence: “I have a voice!” Logue sits up and
says, in a quiet and affirming voice, “Yes,
you do.” The moment is very moving.
Someone with all the status and power
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society can confer, yet who has been, in a
very real sense, powerless, in a moment of
rage and desperation, has demanded
recognition of his humanness: the self has
demanded expression and emerged.
George’s struggles are not over. But
something vital has changed, and it is from
this moment that he gains command of his
voice. The film ends, when as King, he gives
a wartime address to the nation by radio right
after Britain’s declaration of war.87
The pivotal moment when George gains his voice is very moving to audiences,
and understandably so. Despite all the status and power society can confer, he
has been, in a very real sense, rendered powerless; and then, in a moment of
rage and desperation, the self has demanded expression and emerged. In the
world constructed by directors, the protagonist’s passage from weak to strong
begins with a moment in which he or she hits bottom and then strives upwards,
and that realization of agency holds great value for audiences.88 The same

87
A close analogue to these events is the heroic struggle of Winston Churchill, perhaps
the 20th Century’s most accomplished orator, as depicted in the recent (2017) cinematic
version of his memoir, The Darkest Hour. The immense pressures resulting from Britain’s
military defeat in France and the increasing isolation in which Churchill finds himself, as
he advocates for continuing the fight rather than seeking an accommodation with Germany,
cause a contraction of both confidence and ability. At one point he woefully murmurs, “No
one believes in me.” At about that time, this supremely gifted speaker descends into
inchoate, incomprehensible babble as he attempts to dictate a letter. Later, although
nothing in his political situation nor Britain’s military status has changed, two moments
help him to regain his footing. He becomes clear and decisive about pursuing the course
he had determined to follow. He then rallies Parliament and the nation by delivering his
famous “We shall fight” speech, possibly the greatest war speech ever made outside of
Shakespeare’s Henry V. .
88
History too provides dramatic vignettes which demonstrate the power that agency’s
presence can exert on observers. One such moment occurred during the American
Revolutionary War. In the summer of 1777, the British tried to sever New England from
the greater mass of Colonies and in doing so end the War. To accomplish this, General
Bourgogne and his Army of 10,000 troops invaded from Canada and moved south in order
to meet General Howe and his Army which were to move up from the City of New York.
For much of the journey Bourgogne was able to move with relative ease by navigating
Lake Champlain. But at Lake’s end, in order to continue south he was forced to traverse a
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movement occurs, with the same striking value, in actual transformative
mediation sessions, as the examples in the previous section show.

V.

CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE PLACE OF AGENCY IN
MEDIATION

The earlier account of transformative mediation’s development,
buttressed by the examples just presented about the value of asserting and
strengthening agency, should explain why we often find ourselves
disappointed with talented students and practitioners of transformative
mediation. When these students/mediators identify empowerment shifts in the
mediations they conducted and participated in, they do so only when
empowerment served as a harbinger of other changes, such as recognition,
reconciliation or agreement. Certainly, they are not inaccurate in identifying
empowerment as an essential forerunner of these other changes. Due to the
debilitating impacts of conflict, reconnecting with one’s efficacy is almost
always a necessary prelude to the sorts of more visible changes of recognition
that are easily grasped and valued. Flailing about in a state of unclarity and
indecisiveness, and experiencing oneself as ineffectual, pretty much precludes
swampy wilderness. His Army emerged from the inhospitable terrain exhausted and badly
in need of horses, having lost many to the swamp.
Bourgogne received word that Bennington, Vermont, 20 or 30 miles to his east, was
lightly defended and had horses, other draft animals and ample provisions, all of which he
desperately needed if he was to continue south to take Albany. With an eye to replenishing
his stock, he dispatched a force of 700 troops, composed principally of Hessians. They
were to march to Bennington and seize the Colonists’ livestock and provisions. But as
Bourgogne had moved south, Vermonters had appealed for help, and by this time
Bennington was defended by a force of 1,500 militia from New Hampshire and
Massachusetts. Before the 700 could reach Bennington, they were intercepted by the
American militia. In the ensuing battle they were surrounded and then overwhelmed by the
larger American force. As they were marched into captivity, the two Armies had a rare
opportunity to observe one another, not across a field of battle, but at close hand.
There was something about the Americans that struck one of the British officers. It
couldn’t have been their physical appearance; their clothing was not uniform, and it was
ragged. It must have been something in the way they held themselves, in their demeanor.
Perhaps it was in the manner of their speech. But whatever its precise nature and origins,
there was evident in the American troops a quality of self-possession and assurance that to
this officer was both impressive and novel; commoners in Europe simply did not carry
themselves in this fashion. In a letter home to his wife this officer was moved to write, “I
have met the New Man,” meaning “[t]here is a state to which people can attain that I had
not seen ‘til this day.” That state, in a word, was agency. .
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the possibility of reassessing the actions, motives and character of a conflict
counterpart, whom one has typically demonized. One must find one’s footing
before those sorts of experiential and perceptual changes can occur in the
interpersonal realm. We do not dispute any of this.
However, where we differ from our students and from many in the
mediation field, in both our focus and our understanding of success, is that we
believe empowerment shifts have stand-alone value—because they enact
agency.89 We believe that when parties are able to reconnect with their
capabilities, to stand up for themselves, to do so in thoughtful, articulate,
decisive and resolute ways, something good and valuable and essential has
occurred, even should nothing else follow.90 In other words, the enactment of
89

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
There is one change in the way disputants regard their conflict counterparts that
always attends the recapture of agency—but it is really part of empowerment, not a
separate effect of recognition or empathy. That change in perception is related to the ways
in which disputants tend to demonize one another. Beyond ascribing malign motives to
one another, the weakened capacities of conflict participants cause them to endow one
another with heightened powers to destabilize, overwhelm, thwart, or vanquish in some
fashion. Thus, as a party regains efficacy and experiences themselves as stronger, the
capacity of their conflict opponent to affect them negatively is diminished in
commensurate measure. When the full range of change that is available in mediation is
realized, disputants come to see one another more positively. Often, they choose to extend
compassion and empathy to one another. Those changes, termed recognition shifts, involve
seeing one’s counterpart as somehow better. The change we are describing here involves
seeing one’s counterpart as smaller in their ability to inflict harm. In that sense, they
become in one’s eyes, not better, but more manageable.
Describing a particular simulated mediation will demonstrate the correspondence
between the increase of capacity in a disputant and the decrease of the perceived powers
of their counterpart. The mediation, titled, The Purple House, was conducted by one of the
authors. It appears in transcript form in Promise 2. See PROMISE 2, supra note 11, at 133.
There are three parties in the mediation, a homeowner, Elizabeth and her daughter Bernice,
and a second homeowner, Julie, who is also a representative of the Home Owners
Association which governs the development in which they all live. The parts were played
by professional actors, who were given a fact pattern, but not a script to follow. Thus, there
was no predetermined direction the parties would move in, nor was there a predetermined
outcome. Elizabeth and Bernice are African American. Julie is of European descent. Their
dispute arises from the purple color with which Elizabeth and Bernice have painted their
home: Julie and other home owners have adopted the stance that the color selection violates
the rules governing the range of discretion available to home owners; Elizabeth and
Bernice, with the support of others, maintain that the rules do not place boundaries on color
selection. To illustrate our point, we will focus only on Elizabeth. Elizabeth has been
unsettled and agitated in her demeanor and her speech from the outset. At one point in her
interaction with Julie, her agitation intensifies as she addresses Julie, “You know Julie,
90
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agency in itself has profound and essential value—and it can be witnessed in
mediation over and over again. We remain hopeful that mediation students and
practitioners will come to fully appreciate this. Indeed, furthering that goal has
been our purpose in writing this Article.
In conclusion, the above discussion has made the case for several
propositions:
First, the practice of mediation, even by those theoretically committed
to the principle of self-determination, diluted that principle by placing less
importance on client agency than on other values, especially the value of
empathy and relationship.
Second, practitioners of transformative mediation, through a process
of reflection and self-critique, recognized their departure from the principle of

ever since we have moved into the community you’ve been on a personal vendetta. Is it
because we are the only blacks on your block? . . . It is a racist, we are the only family you
are attacking! There is nothing. You are the racist! You are the one!” Beyond being angry,
Elizabeth is distraught as she articulates and holds up what for her is the core of the dispute,
and what she believes to be Julie’s actual motivation. She flails in her movements. Her
thoughts are scattered, and her speech fragmented. She is volatile and without command
of herself. And she depicts Julie (and clearly experiences her) as monstrous in her impact
on Elizabeth’s life.
Elizabeth and Julie continue to interact (with interventions by the mediator) for some
time. During this period, Elizabeth demonstrates small, incremental shifts in her capacity
for clarity of thought and in her ability to be articulate. Her demeanor becomes solid and
centered. She becomes calm. Then she says to Julie, “I’m really hard pressed to accept any
decision by your committee. . . It becomes a matter of control that at this point in my life
that I am simply unwilling to deal with. I mean no animosity; I mean no disrespect. But
we’ve gone as far as we can go.” Elizabeth’s thinking has become cogent and clear, and
her speech both rich and measured. In this moment, she is a superb advocate; she has stood
up for herself with calm, forceful dignity. And clearly, Julie has been correspondingly
reduced in her ability to overwhelm Elizabeth. She has become, to Elizabeth, manageable.
In actuality, the mediation continued on for some 40 minutes beyond this point.
During those 40 minutes Elizabeth affirmed that she saw Julie as a racist, so there is
confirmation that after this moment of calm, forceful advocacy, Elizabeth’s experience of
Julie’s character and motives is unchanged. She does not see Julie as “better.”
This mediation could very well have ended at the point of Elizabeth’s speech to Julie.
Indeed, mediations often end at similar junctures. The sort of “visible changes” involving
recognition or agreement that students hold as the standard of success have not taken place.
Yet, Elizabeth has made strides. She has named the essential wrong as she sees it; she is
clear as to where she stands and where she will not go; she has gathered herself in such a
way as to both oppose the wrong effectively and to convey that opposition to Julie with
dignity and quiet force. The self has entered the world to inform it, and if need be, to meet
adversity well. Agency has been enacted, and its value is clear – even if nothing else
followed.
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self-determination and took steps to correct their actual practices in ways that
did place primary value on client agency.
Third, the meaning of agency, as a basis for mediation and other social
processes, is the self-aware and reflective assertion by an individual of the
intentional choice to make decisions affecting their life circumstances—so
agency and self-determination are related if not identical. Moreover, the
phenomenon of agency is at the core of human identity and consciousness;
that is, the assertion of agency is an essential meaning of being human,
regardless of whether it achieves some other specific impact in the external
world.
Fourth, although the value of client agency and client-centered
practice is largely disfavored in the dominant practices of mediation and many
other “helping” professions—nevertheless that value does find strong
recognition among many in society, as reflected in popular culture, and as
voiced by the clients of transformative mediators reported in this Article.
Finally, the stakes of raising awareness of the importance of agency,
in mediation and other social processes, are very great—implicating the
character of our civic culture and the viability of our democratic society.
Together, these propositions show how important it is that, in any
process such as mediation where a client-centered approach is possible, that
approach should be favored and promoted—since it will recognize and enact
the central value of client agency. Transformative mediation is such a clientcentered approach to mediation. It has gained a following and grown slowly
but steadily in the 25 years since its first introduction. However, given the
societal stakes, it is important to accelerate the acceptance of this model, and
to draw more practitioners toward following it—for the sake of clients in
mediation, and for the sake of our larger social and political environment. The
time has come for the transformative model to receive more recognition and
greater practical emphasis, both in mediation and beyond, since it will bring
the value of human agency out of hiding and into the full light of societal
recognition.
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